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Abstract
In this article we examine how  loose  coupling  between  units  and  people  can  benefit  a
firm’s ability to combine and recombine knowledge-based resources continuously in a creative
and flexible  way.  An  in-depth  study  of  Oticon  A/S  suggests  that  loose  coupling  can  be
deliberately brought into the design  of  the  organisation  by  introducing  a  certain  structural
ambiguity into the configuration of role systems and authority relationships. In the first part  of
the paper, we show how loose coupling among units and people is a distinctive  feature  of  the
way Oticon organises its administrative  activities.  In  the  second,  we  explore  the  structural
properties  of  a  loosely  coupled  arrangement.  We  develop  the  concepts  of   multipolarity,
fluidity and interconnectedness and we show how these properties conduce  to  an  increase  in
the  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  flexibility  of  the   processes   of   knowledge   integration.
Structural ambiguity is thus proposed as a viable design principle  for  organisations  operating
in hypercompetitive environment, where flexible knowledge  integration  represents  a  critical
condition of survival.
  In  hypercompetitive  environments,  where  competitive  advantage  is   quickly   eroded   by
technological development or by the imitative or innovative  behaviour  of  competitors,  firms
are continually engaged in a process of renewal regarding their market strategies  and  product
lines (Baden Fuller, 1994; Dougherty, 1992; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Teece,  Pisano  and
Shuen, 1997). A knowledge-based view of competition suggests that continuous renewal rests,
in turn, on the ability  to  combine  and  recombine  organisational  and  individual  knowledge
continuously into new and creative products and strategies (e.g. Kogut and  Zander,  1992  and
1996; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996;  Quinn,  Anderson  and  Finkelstein,  1996).  Much  of  this
literature assumes, more or less explicitly, that  a  “knowledge  base”  or  “intellectual  capital”
exists  in  the  organisation,  either  as  individual  specialised  knowledge  (i.e.  Grant,   1996a;
Tsoukas, 1996) or as collective knowledge embodied  in  group  routines  and  in  systems  and
structures (i.e. Leonard-Barton, 1992; Kusunoki, Nonaka and Nagata, 1998), and then  focuses
on how to identify and make the best use  of  this  dispersed  and  often  tacit  knowledge.  The
design of processes and structures that provide the organisation with a comparative  advantage
in the managing processes of creating, acquiring, sharing, transferring, replicating, storing  and
retrieving  knowledge  has  therefore  been  proposed  as  a  critical  strategic  variable  (Grant,
1996b).
However, although the “what” has been widely discussed by management  scholars,  much
remains to be said about the “how”. A major stream of research has investigated – mostly at  a
theoretical level – the common requirements conducive to knowledge integration, in  terms  of
organisational or managerial capabilities (Kogut and Zander,  1992;  Grant,  1996a;  Volberda,
1996; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). But the way firms develop these crucial  capabilities  is
still left largely unexplained, or is attributed mainly to institutional specificity and to historical
path-dependency. The result is that little  help  can  be  provided  for  managers,  apart  from  a
general recommendation to  strive  to  develop  “architectural”  (Henderson  and  Clark,  1990;
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) or “dynamic” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) capabilities to
support the integration process. In this article, following the  prescription  in  Mahoney  (1995)
for shifting research away from the content and towards the process of  strategic  management,
we try to move one step further along the chain of causality and to  investigate  the  conditions
that  lead  to  the  development  of  an  organisational  capability  for   knowledge   integration.
Building on evidence from a case study of Oticon A/S, an excellent performer and outstanding
product innovator in the hearing-aid  industry,  we  argue  that  the  firm’s  ability  to  integrate
knowledge has benefited  from  the  properties  of  a  loosely  coupled  structural  arrangement,
characterised by structural ambiguity in the distribution  of  authority  and  in  the  role  system
(Weick, 1976). Contrary to the prevailing interpretation, we argue that loose  coupling  can  be
the consequence of a deliberate structural choice about the division of labour,  the  distribution
of  authority,  and  the  co-ordination  of  activities.  By  tracing  the  links  between   structural
ambiguity and knowledge integration  along  a  range  of  structural  solutions  and  managerial
actions, we discuss how and why the introduction of a degree of freedom and ambiguity in the
role system and in the authority  structure  may  conduce  to  significant  improvements  in  the
pace and effectiveness of the knowledge-integration process.
In the first part of the article  we  identify  and  describe  loose  coupling  among  units  and
people as the distinctive feature  of  the  structural  arrangements  of  Oticon  A/S.  In  the  first
section we introduce the case study and present our method of data collection and analysis.  In
the following section, we describe and discuss the managerial actions and design  choices  that
dismantled the tight coupling mechanism and established  a  looser  order  based  on  structural
ambiguity  in  the  hierarchy  and  the  role  system.   In   the   second   part,   we   explore   the
characteristics  that  led  from  structural  ambiguity  to  an  enhanced  ability  to  generate  and
combine knowledge into successful new products and strategies. Building on insights from the
case study, we develop the concept  of  “multipolarity”,  “fluidity”  and  “interconnectedness”,
and show how these are related to continuous innovation through a  creative  combination  and
recombination of individual and organisational knowledge.
Research Method
By its very nature the empirical study of  new  organisational  forms  demands  a  focus  on
companies at the forefront of experimentation with new organisational  solutions.  A  profound
understanding of the mechanisms and processes  that  confer  on  these  companies  a  superior
adaptive or innovative ability is a necessary precondition for the development of middle-range
theories. Rich, qualitative methods for data collection and analysis are  likely  to  be  the  most
appropriate, given the early stage of  research  in  the  field  (Daft  and  Lewin,  1993;  Ilinitch,
D’Aveni and Lewin, 1996). We therefore based our research on an  in-depth  exploratory  case
study of a high-end hearing-aid manufacturer - Oticon A/S. We selected the company  because
of  the  high  visibility  of  the  research   topic   (Pettigrew,   1990)   and   the   sustained   high
performance of the company within its industry (Rouse and Daellenbach,  1999).  In  1991  the
company underwent a radical transformation of structures, systems and processes aimed at the
creation of a faster, more creative and more efficient organisation that would  be  able  to  take
advantage of the upcoming transition from analog amplifiers  to  digital  signal  processing.  A
traditional functional structure was changed in what the  newly  appointed  CEO,  Lars  Kolind
(1994), called a “knowledge-based organisation”. This radical change  is  given  credit  for  the
unprecedented results in terms of growth rate and return on equity that the  company  achieved
in the following years (Peters, 1992), and has been maintained  at  least  until  this  article  was
being written.
Our study relied on  archival  data  collection  -  financial  statements,  internal  documents,
corporate publications and other written material  -  as  well  as  in-depth  interviews  with  the
CEO, senior managers and other employees at  the  headquarters  and  the  research  facility  in
Copenhagen,  and  at  the  Italian  subsidiary  in  Florence.  Following  Friedberg   (1993),   we
selected our informants by balancing between different professional areas, and different  levels
of responsibility and seniority, in order to gather and  integrate  a  variety  of  perspectives.  At
least one representative of each key role in the new organisation  was  interviewed.  We  began
each interview by asking about the background of the respondent and about his or  her  role  in
the new system. We asked respondents about the organisational transformation carried out  six
years earlier and how it had affected their own activities. We  then  focused  on  the  processes
and mechanisms that now keep the organisation  functioning,  covering  areas  such  as  human
resource management, product development, and the  strategic  decision  process.  Finally,  we
asked   respondents   about   the   improvement   in   the   performance   of   the    organisation.
Respondents were asked to describe not only historical  events  or  formal  structures  but  also
personal perceptions and  feelings.  All  questions  were  open-ended,  so  that  all  respondents
could freely relate their personal perspective on the transformation process and the functioning
of the new organisation. In order not to impose our own theoretical frame of reference  on  our
informants’  interpretations,  we   carefully   avoided   referring   explicitly   to   concepts   like
“knowledge”, “knowledge integration” or  “knowledge  management.”  Each  interview  lasted
about an hour. A subsequent follow-up was conducted to clarify  minor  details,  to  solve  any
small discrepancies and to integrate the different perspectives.
An analysis of the interviews was then conducted independently  by  the  two  authors  and
was integrated with the results of the archival data collection. Given the early  stage  of  theory
development on innovative  organisational  forms,  we  followed  a  logic  of  grounded  theory
building, which implies  deriving  theoretical  insights  from  a  qualitative  study  (Glaser  and
Strauss, 1967). Our aim was to build on, and move beyond, our informants’ interpretations,  in
an  attempt  to  explicate  facts  and  narrative  within   an   emerging   theoretical   framework.
Although our analysis followed a sequential path, results from each  stage  were  adjusted  and
refined as new interpretations modified the overall framework. In a first stage of  the  analysis,
we focused on the transformation process  and  identified  and  analysed  in  detail  the  critical
changes that affected the organisation. Karl Weick’s concept of loose coupling  soon  emerged
as a helpful theoretical reference in interpreting and describing the change as  the  introduction
of  a  degree  of  ambiguity  into  the   tight-coupling   mechanisms   of   the   organisation.   In
accordance   with   Weick’s   methodological   prescriptions   for   studying   loosely    coupled
organisations (Weick, 1976), our first concern  was  then  to  flesh  out  and  provide  adequate
evidence of the structural loose coupling in the new organisation.  A  historical  reconstruction
of the events based on our informants’ accounts and  on  archival  sources  helped  us  to  trace
back the introduction of ambiguity  in  the  authority  structure  and  the  role  system  into  the
decisions and actions that brought about the transformation.
In a second stage we concentrated on  ways  in  which  the  new  organisation  could  solve
problems that are commonly ascribed to loosely coupled  organisations  (Weick,  1976,  Orton
and Weick, 1990). More specifically, we investigated how the organisation could prevent local
rationality and opportunistic behaviour from prevailing over a logic of overall  efficiency,  and
how  individual  actions  were  oriented  towards  a  common  goal  even  in   the   absence   of
traditional tight control mechanisms. This second step improved our understanding of the  way
the new organisation works,  and  helped  us  to  form  a  more  detailed  picture  of  the  social
dynamics  within  it.  Findings  from  this  second  stage  also  led  to  theoretical   insights   on
alternative  sources  of  order  in  loosely  coupled  systems,  which  have  been  presented  and
discussed more extensively elsewhere (Ravasi and Verona, 1998).
In a third stage we analysed the factors that  were  associated  by  our  informants  with  the
improved performance of the innovation process. We searched  our  informants’  accounts  for
causal associations between measures of outcome (i.e. improved  efficiency,  reduced  time-to-
market, etc.) and the distinctive features  of  the  new  organisation.  Our  concern  was  not  so
much to “count” causal associations,  as  to  reconstruct  the  underlying  logic  of  the  system.
Consequentiality, plausibility, and internal consistency were considered  more  important  than
frequency.  Our  analysis  revealed  evidence  that  improved  performance  in  the   innovative
process was related to three structural properties of the new organisation,  whose  development
could in turn be traced back to the managerial actions that established  structural  ambiguity  in
the organisation. A repeated iteration with some of our informants, to whom we submitted  our
descriptions and provisional interpretations, helped us to refine our analysis and reinforced our
confidence in the plausibility of our arguments.
In the next section we will describe the changes  that  affected  Oticon’s  structure  and  we
will argue how these changes established loose coupling in the system by introducing a degree
of  indeterminacy  in  the  role  structure  and  in  the  authority  system.  We  will   show   how
indeterminacy results from the possibility for individuals to  redefine  their  own  roles  and  to
negotiate  dependence  relationships,  and  from  the  distribution  of  tasks,  such   as   the   co-
ordination of functional skills  or  the  allocation  of  resources  and  rewards,  that  are  usually
concentrated in hierarchical positions. In the  following  sections,  we  will  discuss  the  major
findings of our analysis. Building on our  informants’  accounts,  we  will  trace  the  enhanced
innovative ability back to structural properties of  the  new  organisation  which  increased  the
pace and effectiveness of the knowledge-integration process. In each section,  using  a  method
common in inductive studies, we will  first  present  empirical  evidence  and  then  discuss  its
theoretical implications.
Building a Loosely Coupled Structure
By the end of the 1970s Oticon occupied the  number  one  position  in  the  world  market,
with a share of about 15 per cent. Throughout the 1980s, however, while the industry  evolved
and saw the emergence of “in-the-ear” (ITE) hearing aids, Oticon continued to rely on the  old
“behind-the-ear”  (BTE)   devices,   that   were   considered   cosmetically   inferior   by   most
customers. Oticon’s market share plummeted, and by 1987 the company was  suffering  heavy
financial losses. The rationalization  measures  adopted  by  the  newly  appointed  CEO,  Lars
Kolind, brought the company back into the black in two years.  However,  the  new  CEO  was
aware that more serious changes were needed in order to regain market leadership.
By the end of the 1980s Oticon was organised according to a traditional division of  labour
and authority: functional departments such as marketing, finance, and manufacturing were  led
by managers, who were  also  members  of  the  senior-management  team  responsible  for  all
strategic  decisions.  Functional  heads  managed  their  departments  as  fiefdoms   and   cross-
functional communication was rare. In the dawn of the radical changes  that  would  affect  the
industry in the coming years, this structure was considered  inadequate  for  the  new  strategic
requirements. The new top management believed, in fact, that the emergence of  digital  signal
processing  would  reward  the  ability  “to  combine  different   expertise   into   new   creative
solutions” – as Kolind officially declared. In this context, cross-functional communication and
co-operation would become critical; a new way of thinking and working was needed. The new
CEO described the implications of the technological discontinuity to us as follows:
It is a matter of complexity. Going  from  analogue  to  digital  technology  and  increasing
flexibility in our product offer meant an enormous increase in complexity: the  instruments
we were  producing  in  the  eighties  had  about  a  hundred  components,  the  product  we
launched a year ago has 230,000 components. In addition, the way the product is fitted and
customised is very different. In 1980 you just turned two  or  four  screws;  now  you  have
more than a hundred controls  and  you  need  a  computer  to  integrate  all  the  diagnostic
instruments  and  information,  combined   with   the   subjective   data   about   the   sound
environment  in  which  the  customer  works  and  lives.  All  this  information  has  to   be
integrated  into  an  expert  system.  It  is  the  knowledge  you  put  into  that  system   that
determines the success of the product.
In 1991 radical changes were consequently introduced in the way the headquarters – administration, research
and development, and marketing, to a total of approximately 150 people – were organised. The  formal  structures
regulating the task system were completely dismantled. Departments, positions, titles, and job  descriptions  were
all abolished and a radical project-based organisation was introduced. Most headquarters  activities  are  now  run
by project teams. To begin with, even financial and accounting activities were assigned to projects,  although  the
intrinsic repetitiveness of the tasks underlying such activities  subsequently  brought  the  company  to  reorganise
them in separate units. A “multi-job system” has replaced traditional jobs: everyone  is  now  responsible  for  the
development of a portfolio of jobs – corresponding to the activities performed in the  different  projects  in  which
they take part – according to their own inclinations,  skills,  and  personal  aspirations.  To  start  with,  employees
were  not  only  encouraged  but  were  even  required  to  include  tasks  outside  their   specific   competence   or
professional area in their portfolio of activities, so most employees now perform several different activities, some
of which are outside their formal areas of competence or education.
Most of the previous department heads have become “professional managers” -  specialists
whose task is to co-ordinate the diverse professional skills  involved  in  product  development
and  other  activities.  Few  of  the  professional  areas  correspond   to   the   old   departments:
Marketing and Audiology, Quality Assurance and several  technological  development  groups
known  as  “competence  centres”  (Integrated  Circuit,  Mechanical  Engineering,   etc.)   have
replaced the old functions. Professional managers are  responsible  for  securing  technological
and human resources for the projects. They are responsible for  selecting,  hiring  and  training
people and co-ordinating the development of internal skills. They are also  responsible  for  the
acquisition or the  in-house  development  of  technology  in  their  specific  area.  Professional
managers have a co-ordinating role, but they do not  manage  anybody  in  a  traditional  sense.
People are free to decide about their own  working  hours,  vacation  days,  and  the  time  they
allocate to the different projects in which they take part. They are not  assigned  to  tasks  by  a
professional manager, but are encouraged to participate, according  to  their  own  competence
and interest.
Every project has a project leader who is responsible not only for  completing  the  project,
but also for assembling the project group. The formation of a project team,  then,  is  the  result
of negotiations among project leaders and would-be members, although professional managers
often take part in it. The  resolution  of  conflicts  among  different  projects  is  left  to  mutual
agreement: the project managers, the employees and their professional  managers  try  to  work
out a solution  that  is  acceptable  to  everyone.  If  they  can’t  reach  an  agreement,  then  top
management intervenes, but informants reported that this happens on average once  every  two
months.
A so-called development group co-ordinates the overall process. The development group is
composed of seven senior managers, among  whom  are  the  CEO,  the  head  of  the  research
group, and the co-ordinators of quality assurance,  product  development,  and  marketing  and
audiology.  The  development  group  is  in  fact  the  only  hierarchical  level   that   has   been
maintained. One of our informants  referred  to  it  as  a  sort  of  “board  of  directors”  for  the
projects. The development group’s  main  responsibilities  are  the  evaluation  of  new  project
initiatives, the allocation of financial resources to new and ongoing projects, and their periodic
monitoring.  The  development  group  sets   the   strategic   priorities   of   the   company   and
communicates them to the others at information meetings  held  once  a  month.  Priorities  are
discussed with  all  the  employees  and  project  proposals  are  evaluated  according  to  these
priorities. The evaluation process is kept as simple and informal as possible. A member of  the
group described it as follows:
Someone comes along and says: “I have an idea.” We say: “Fine.  Could  you  make  some
sort of proposal?” At the next meeting of the development  group  we  call  that  person  in.
We have him explain about his idea and we discuss it. Then  we  decide.  (…)  We  do  not
rank projects, but every project is evaluated on its own merits. We try  very  hard  to  work
towards a consensual decision. We obviously calculate expected costs and benefits, we  try
to assess the size of the market for new products, the price they can be sold at, etc.  but  we
do not have a nice formalised system based on specific parameters:  it’s  all  “gut  feeling”.
But then again we are all basically experts.
Finally,  an  important  role  in  the  new  organisation  is  played  by  the  so-called  “mentors”   (or   “people
managers”), whose responsibilities are to support their pupils’ personal and professional development,  to  review
their performance and to co-ordinate  annual  salary  adjustments.  The  mentors’  decisions  on  salary  increases,
career promotions, and education are not arbitrary, but are usually made  after  consulting  with  all  the  people  –
project  leaders  and  team  mates,  professional  managers,  etc.  –  with  whom  their  pupils  have  recently  been
working. Even selecting or changing a mentor is subject to negotiation. Initially, people are associated with  those
who hired them and who co-ordinate their primary  skill  area,  but  later  they  have  the  chance  to  change  their
mentor, if for any reason they are dissatisfied. There are no exact rules about  mentorship.  Almost  anyone  could
be a mentor, provided they have some seniority: employees are simply expected to make “a reasonable choice”.
The theory of loosely-coupled systems seems to  offer  a  powerful  conceptual  framework
for interpreting the deep structural changes mentioned  above.  The  theory  of  loose  coupling
suggests  that  co-ordinated  action  is  accomplished  through  a  technical  and  a  hierarchical
coupling based on the task system and the authority  structure  (Weick,  1976).  The  former  is
related to the division of labour among units and subunits, to the attribution of roles and to  the
definition of procedures; the  latter  refers  to  the  distribution  of  responsibility,  of  decision-
making authority, and of control over rewards. In some cases factors such as the fragmentation
of authority or the distribution of critical knowledge reduce the level of coupling in the system
and alternative solutions  must  be  sought  to  achieve  co-ordinated  action  (Firestone,  1985;
Gamoran and Dreeben, 1986).
The concept of  loose  coupling  was  proposed  by  Karl  Weick  (1976)  as  an  alternative
perspective for the analysis of educational organisations. Later, it  was  adopted  as  a  research
framework for the study of ambiguous structures and unconventional organisations. With  few
exceptions (e.g. Hedberg, 1984; Sanchez  and  Mahoney,  1996),  however,  most  research  on
loosely coupled systems has been carried out  in  organisations  such  as  schools  (e.g.  Weick,
1976, Gamoran and  Dreeben,  1986)  or  hospitals  (e.g.  Denis,  Langley  and  Cazale,  1996),
rather than firms. Most researchers, in fact,  tend  to  consider  loose  coupling  as  an  intrinsic
attribute of certain  kinds  of  organisation:  a  consequence  of  their  primary  activity  (Clark,
1983), of a lack of clear  goals  and  of  the  complexity  of  the  authority  relationship  (Denis,
Langley and Cazale, 1996), or of the ambiguity of the technology  involved  in  the  operations
(Hardy,  Langley,  Mintzberg  and  Rose,  1984).  In  these  circumstances,  loose  coupling   is
considered a natural condition of  the  system.  In  the  case  of  Oticon,  it  was  the  deliberate
introduction of elements of ambiguity into  the  role  system  and  the  authority  structure  that
brought the company to change from a tightly-coupled to a loosely-coupled  organisation.  The
causal links between  actions,  events  and  the  establishment  of  a  looser  coupling,  as  these
emerged from our longitudinal analysis, are displayed in Figure 1.
----------------------------------
insert Figure 1 about here
----------------------------------
Introducing ambiguity into the role system means  that  although  a  new  set  or  roles  and
positions has been created (professional manager,  people  manager,  etc.),  the  distribution  of
these roles is not defined a priori by design, because the multi-job system allows the  changing
needs of the organisation and people’s evolving competencies and  inclinations  to  continually
redefine the role system. Also, in the authority structure, professional  co-ordination  has  been
de-coupled from control over rewards. Neither  professional  managers  nor  project  managers
actually have any hierarchical authority over one another or over the people  they  co-ordinate,
and although  control  over  rewards  (i.e.  salary  increases)  ultimately  resides  in  the  people
managers, it is  subject  to  revocation,  so  that  by  changing  their  mentors  people  have  the
opportunity to subtract themselves from the exercise of power. Even the central  determination
of priorities  and  allocation  of  resources  is  balanced  by  dispersed  initiative  and  the  local
allocation of time and skills.
As  Orton  and  Weick  (1990)  suggest,  this  ambiguity,  this   simultaneous   presence   of
elements of coupling and uncoupling, is at the core of the concept of loose  coupling,  whereby
the  links  among  the  interdependent  elements  in   the   system   preserve   some   degree   of
determinacy, but are subject at the same time to spontaneous change. At any point in  time  the
activity of the development group ensures that priorities are clear, people’s jobs and objectives
are defined, and projects have tasks for which their leaders are held  responsible.  A  once-and-
for-all representation of the organisation, however, is not possible, as projects are initiated and
terminated,  responsibilities  shift  and  roles  modify,  while  no  formal  structure,  no  precise
division of labour or authority provide a stable point of reference over  time.  The  structure  is
not superimposed on the flow of the process as it is in a tightly coupled organisation;  rather  it
is defined at any time by the allocation  of  people,  resources  and  tasks  among  the  projects.
People’s roles within the organisation are not defined by  their  positions  or  job  descriptions,
but by their evolving portfolio of jobs. The  division  of  labour  thus  changes  continually,  as
people take part in new projects, develop new skills and eventually redefine their roles. In  this
sense the structure is continually being reproduced according to current needs, and  it  emerges
from the interaction between the people initiating, running and taking part in the projects. It  is
this  continual  interaction,  and  not  a  pre-determined  plan  or  design,  that  determines   the
allocation of time, resources and attention, and ultimately the structure of  the  organisation.  It
is the interplay of people at every level, who possess the capability  to  identify  resources  and
combine them in new ways, that continuously redesigns the organisation,  redistributing  roles,
tasks and responsibilities.
Structural Properties of Loose Coupling and the Effective Integration of Knowledge
In   the   years   following   the   transformation,   Oticon’s   innovative   ability    improved
substantially.  The  development  time  for  new  products  halved   and   the   innovation   rate,
expressed in terms of proportion of sales due to new products,  more  than  doubled.  By  1993
half of Oticon’s sales were already being accounted for by products introduced in the previous
two years (just before the change the corresponding figure was only 20 per cent). In five years,
from  1991  to  1996,  Oticon  was  able  to  introduce  two   radical   reconfigurations   of   the
architecture of the product (see Table 1). MultiFocus in 1992 and DigiFocus  in  1996  marked
two  substantial  discontinuities  in  the  technology  and  design  of  hearing  aids.  MultiFocus
introduced a fully automatic system for adjusting amplification and tonal balance according  to
the frequency of sounds, while traditional hearing aids used to amplify weak  sounds  as  much
as loud  sounds,  and  high  frequencies  as  much  as  low  ones,  so  that  people  had  to  keep
adjusting  the  volume  control.  The  commercial  success  of   MultiFocus   was   far   beyond
expectations and helped the company to regain market shares in the  declining  BTE  segment.
Yet MultiFocus technology, although relying on electronic circuitry for sound processing, was
still  based  on   analogue   amplification.   In   1996   the   introduction   of   DigiFocus   again
reconfigured the basic architecture of the product and opened  up  a  fast-growing  and  highly-
profitable segment that soon  accounted  for  a  considerable  share  of  the  market  worldwide
(Business Week, 1999). DigiFocus  was  in  fact  the  first  fully  digital  hearing  aid  and  was
programmed to reproduce sounds in an entirely new way: sounds of different frequency  could
be processed separately and the amplification could be  constantly  adjusted  according  to  the
changes in the external environment. DigiFocus could therefore improve speech understanding
in a wider variety of  situations,  including  noisy  environments.  Again,  Oticon  set  the  new
standard  and  further  eroded  the  market  shares  of  its  larger  competitors,  who  were   still
exploring the possibilities of the new technologies.
During these  years  the  company  paced  the  rate  of  innovation  by  alternating  products
which, without altering the basic technological architecture, incorporated incremental  changes
exploiting the potential of current  designs,  making  them  more  appealing  to  specific  target
groups. In 1993 an expansion of the MultiFocus concept led to MultiFocus Mild, a hearing aid
suited to younger people with an incipient hearing reduction, produced as a mini  BTE  and  an
ITE. Later, MicroFocus combined the knowledge gained from  MultiFocus  with  some  of  the
digital technology that would later be fully applied to DigiFocus, as it could be programmed to
filter sounds according not only to the specific impairment of the individual patients,  but  also
to their preferences for sound quality factors and their specific  communicative  context.  Even
the DigiFocus basic design was soon refined  and  applied  to  a  new  family  of  hearing  aids,
DigiLife, operating on a simpler and faster fitting principle, which could also  be  programmed
using a small portable called EasyFit.
In an effort to  reframe  the  general  perception  of  hearing  aids,  Oticon  also  introduced
significant changes in the aesthetic aspects of the product. First, the external appearance of  all
the visible external devices was redesigned. More appealing shapes and surface  textures  were
chosen, and a different colour (titanium) used, in order to  encourage  an  association  with  hi-
tech consumer electronics rather than medical  devices  for  handicapped  people.  Further,  the
Personic line was released in a variety of colours, with a view to harmonising with  the  wearer
hair type, rather than making a poor attempt at reproducing the skin colour, thus  changing  the
perception of the hearing aid from something to  hide  to  a  “modern  communication  system,
that reflects the user’s personality, hair–style and life-style.” Finally, the company  designed  a
special line for  young  hearing-impaired  people,  Oticon  4  Kids,  based  on  a  colourful  and
original look  and  a  specifically  designed  package  and  information  material,  all  meant  to
reduce the psychological burden of wearing a hearing aid at a young age.
----------------------------------
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Most of our informants generally attributed this sustained  stream  of  new  products  to  an
improved ability in the organisation to exploit the individual skills, information and ideas  that
resided  in  the  engineering  department,  in  the  research  centre,  among  the  marketing  and
production people, and to harness all  these  to  all  stages  of  the  development  projects.  This
interpretation is consistent with a dominant perspective on  new  product  development,  which
conceives innovation as the creative integration  of  knowledge  of  different  kinds  (scientific,
technological, marketing, etc.) into a comprehensive package of attributes that  constitutes  the
product  configuration  (Dougherty,  1992).  To  put  it  in  another  way,   a   knowledge-based
perspective suggests that long-term, continuous renewal rests on three  processes  conceptually
distinct but intertwined in practice:
•  dispersed  development  of  specialised  knowledge  of  different  kinds,  as  a  product   of
individual and collective learning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Henderson and Cockburn,
1994);
• creative and  valuable  integration  of  specialised  knowledge  into  strategic  initiatives  or
product development projects (Burgelman, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Dougherty, 1992;
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996a);
• periodic reconfiguration, through changes in the dominant design and competitive logic, of
the patterns of  combined  knowledge  that  form  the  essence  of  products  and  strategies
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Rodan, 1998).
According to Grant (1996a), the effectiveness  of  this  renewal  process  depends  on  three
characteristics of the underlying process of knowledge  integration,  namely  the  efficiency  of
the integration, its scope and its  flexibility.  The  efficiency  of  the  process  is  related  to  the
extent  to  which  the  firm  is  able  to  access  and  utilise  the  pool  of  knowledge  and  skills
possessed by individual members. The efficiency of the process is then related to the  depth  of
the individual specialist knowledge that the firm  is  able  to  harness,  while  the  scope  of  the
integration refers to its breadth and variety. The greater the scope, the higher the complexity of
the resulting product, and consequently the difficulty for competitors to replicate  the  formula.
Finally,  given  that   hypercompetitive   environments   require   the   continuous   renewal   of
competitive advantage, the effectiveness of the process requires a degree of flexibility - i.e. the
process  should  be  open  to  a  periodic  reconfiguration  of  the  patterns  of  integration   that
constitute products and strategies. Grant is less explicit, though, on  how  a  firm  can  improve
the efficiency, the scope and the flexibility of their integration process.
Moving  a  step  back  in  the  investigation  of  the  conditions  that  sustained   continuous
innovation in Oticon in the last decade, we found that  three  structural  properties  of  the  new
organisation emerged as the cornerstones of  the  knowledge  integration  process.  We  named
these properties multipolarity, fluidity and interconnectedness. In  the  following  sections,  we
trace the roots of these properties to events and  actions  that  introduced  structural  ambiguity
into the system and we show how they are associated with the enhanced ability to manage  the
innovation process at  Oticon.  We  also  relate  evidence  from  the  case  to  the  requirements
identified by Grant.  The  relations  between  elements  of  loose  coupling,  specific  structural
properties, and effective knowledge integration, are summarised in Table 2.
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Distributing the management of knowledge flows
The analysis of the development  process  that  led  to  Oticon’s  major  innovations  in  the
1990s  revealed  that  although  some  projects   were   induced   and   sponsored   by   the   top
management (i.e. MultiFocus), others  were  the  product  of  the  spontaneous  aggregation  of
individual knowledge and ideas (i.e. MicroFocus). In both cases, the pace and effectiveness  of
the  process  was  related  by  some  of  our  informants  to  the   fundamental   distribution   of
responsibility for managing people’s “skills”, “ideas”, and “perspectives”  and  for  integrating
them along development projects.
On the one hand, professional and people managers  described  themselves  as  responsible
for the co-ordination of all the activities related to the acquisition, development and transfer of
what one of them called “knowledge resources” and another called “professional skills”. More
specifically, people managers have  responsibility  for  the  professional  growth  of  individual
employees; in other words, they are responsible for the development of specialised skills at the
individual level. Professional managers, on the other hand,  are  responsible  for  co-ordinating
the acquisition and development of specialised knowledge  of  specific  kinds  (i.e.  marketing,
integrated circuit design, audiology etc.), be it embodied in technical devices, in data bases,  in
design rules or in people’s  skills.  Development  projects  exploit  technological,  scientific  or
marketing  knowledge  developed  in  the  professional  areas  and  competence   centres.   The
Integrated Circuit Group, for example, launched a project known as “LEGO”,  to  define  a  set
of building blocks for the circuits developed  within  projects.  As  commonalties  between  the
needs of the different projects in terms of IC design range  between  50  and  90  per  cent,  the
LEGO project aimed at optimising component design, so that developing circuits  for  specific
projects would  get  faster  and  more  efficient.  New  technological  knowledge  is  often  also
developed as a by-product of development  projects.  To  some  extent  this  locally  developed
knowledge circulates spontaneously  as  a  consequence  of  the  numerous  links  provided  by
people participating in different projects  and  bringing  experience  developed  elsewhere  into
each project. However, the active co-ordination of knowledge  transfer  among  projects  takes
place at the level of the professional area or the  competence  centre.  A  competence  manager
who  we  interviewed  told  us  how  he  organised  weekly  meeting  at  which  all  the  people
involved in the projects discussed issue of general interest for a  couple  of  hours  together,  so
that individual learning could be shared across projects.
The integration of specialised individual knowledge into new products and ventures, on the
other hand, takes place at the project level. In  this  respect,  dispersed  spontaneous  initiatives
play a fundamental role in the change process. One of the project leaders who we  interviewed
gave us an example of the way new product development or adjustments  in  market  strategies
have arisen as a result of individual or group initiative:
Some of the engineers who had been working for the MultiFocus project  thought  that  the
commercial success of the product  needed  a  fast  follow-up  in  technological  terms:  the
dimensions of the hearing aid had to be reduced and its appearance  made  more  appealing
to the customers. I was one of the  engineers.  Together  with  some  marketing  people  we
developed a business plan independently, and we proposed four new product  development
projects.
Their  proposal  was  approved  with  minor  modifications  (one   product   was   cancelled)   and   two   new
development projects soon started: a new BTE hearing aid and a smaller version of an ITE hearing aid, that  were
later sold under the name MultiFocus Mild. Due to lack of resources, it was a year before the third project started,
but it led to the development of an innovative canal hearing aid using digital signal processing, MicroFocus.
Once the projects have started, the efficiency and  pace  of  the  process  are  stimulated  by
granting the project leaders full  responsibility  to  get  the  projects  done.  At  Oticon,  project
management –  i.e.  co-ordinating  the  use  of  human,  technological  and  financial  resources
throughout the projects – is considered a  skill  in  its  own  right,  and  although  to  start  with
project leadership  was  entrusted  to  a  member  of  the  project  group  who  also  contributed
professional skills, later several people became full-time project leaders. In  the  words  of  one
of our informants, “the project manager is considered responsible to get, not  the  product,  but
the ‘business’ developed.” Project managers are asked to adopt  a  broad  perspective,  because
part of their function is to bring together people with different  backgrounds.  In  this  way  the
project managers facilitate the integration of individual specialised knowledge,  both  in  terms
of professional skills and functional culture, within the  development  project.  Project  leaders
are also responsible  for  project  budgets,  attending  to  all  the  economic  aspects  of  project
activities. Further, project leaders have broad  control  over  the  use  of  resources:  within  the
assigned limits, they are free to allocate their budget as they think fit. The  development  group
co-ordinates the  overall  process.  Although  top  management  recognises  the  importance  of
spontaneous creative initiatives, such initiatives should, to some degree, be consistent with one
another  and  with  the  general  direction  of   change.   At   Oticon   the   development   group
accomplishes this function by setting  priorities  and  communicating  the  strategic  guidelines
that orient the direction of  autonomous  initiatives,  and  through  the  allocation  of  resources
among different projects and their periodic review.
Grant (1996a) claims that if knowledge integration is to be carried  out  efficiently  -  i.e.  if
development  teams  are  to  access  the  full  breadth  and  depth  of  the  available  knowledge
relevant to the project - the structure of authority, communication and decision making  should
reflect  what  he  calls  “the  architecture  of  capabilities”,  i.e.  the  distribution  of  skills   and
capabilities among individuals, units and functions. At Oticon the introduction of  elements  of
ambiguity into the role system and the  fragmentation  of  authority  were  associated  with  the
multiplication of the centres and dimensions of co-ordination in the structure – a property  that
we have termed multipolarity. In the distribution of roles  the  traditional  principle  of  gradual
decomposition  and  simplification  of  tasks  down  the   hierarchy   was   abandoned.   In   the
fundamental knowledge-integration process responsibility  was  de-coupled  from  hierarchical
positions,  and  –  more  importantly  –  responsibility  for  the  development  and   transfer   of
knowledge was separated from responsibility for knowledge integration at  the  individual  and
organisational level.
The result is that the overall knowledge-integration process is now carried  out  by  way  of
multiple  co-ordination  centres,  each  one  focusing  on  the  integration  of  capabilities  of  a
different level. At a first level of integration, competence-centre managers are  responsible  for
developing and integrating individual knowledge (i.e.  digital  programming)  into  specialised
professional capabilities pertaining to  different  functional  areas  and  technological  domains
(i.e. integrated circuit design). Unlike traditional functional managers, whose task is also to co-
ordinate and control their  subordinates  and  all  the  activities  that  fall  within  their  domain,
competence-centre  managers  are  able  to  dedicate  all  their  efforts   and   attention   to   the
development  of   skills   and   knowledge.   Although   developing   or   acquiring   specialised
knowledge  is  an  important  prerequisite  for  continuous  innovation,  sustainable  innovation
requires – as we have noted –  the  integration  of  a  broad  set  of  specialised  knowledge.  At
Oticon this role is performed by project managers, who facilitate the combination of  all  kinds
of specialised capabilities (IT design, market analysis, audiological field research, etc.)  in  the
course of strategic initiatives in which new products or market strategies are developed, thanks
to the broad perspective adopted by the project managers and to their  “neutral”  position  with
respect to the different professional areas. At a higher level, finally, the  co-ordination  activity
of the development group determines the overall strategic direction and business development,
leveraging on broad  functional  and  cross-functional  capabilities  (digital  sound  processing,
hearing-aid fitting, etc.), and integrating technological, audiological and market knowledge.
Facilitating the mobility of people and the emergence of ideas
As the new CEO pointed out, a basic principle underlying Oticon’s  restructuring  was  that
if the company was to take full advantage of each and  every  person’s  potential  contribution,
“jobs should be designed to fit the man and not the other  way  around.”  Indeed,  Lars  Kolind
believed  that  rigid  positions  restricted  the  full  development  of  the  individual’s  skills   in
accordance with their own particular needs and aspirations. As a member of  the  development
group remarked:
One of the reasons why we have abolished the concept of departments is  that  departments
tend to close you in: good engineers, for example, may  also  possess  very  good  skills  in
some particular aspects of marketing. Project groups provide an opportunity for  people  to
exercise skills of different kinds: people may not use their skills to one  hundred  per  cent,
but they surely use them more than in a traditional structure, where they are discouraged to
use them outside their department.
Also, the cancellation of departmental membership removed a fundamental obstacle to the mobility of people
and ideas, reducing the social and psychological burden involved in the decision to move  from  a  department  to
another. One of the managers we interviewed described the problem in a simple but vivid way:
Occasionally you may have someone in a company  saying:  “I  don’t  want  to  work  here
anymore. I want to work in another department.” That can be dramatic. In our case  that  is
not  a  problem  at  all:  you  can  be  one-third  engineer   or   accountant,   and   two-thirds
marketing. If you develop the right  skills,  you  will  gradually  move  from  one  group  to
another
And certainly the internal flexibility of the multi-job system did allow several people to find  better  positions
within the organisation. Some engineers, for instance, moved to marketing, while other  employees  became  full-
time project managers; yet others maintained an ambiguous position that allowed them to exercise different skills
at the same time. Everybody felt free to contribute to activities and to improve them and to take part  in  decisions
that fell outside their own main professional domain.  Later,  the  absence  of  departments  and  structured  career
paths also made it easier for people to adjust their jobs and positions  gradually  in  line  with  their  personal  and
professional development. Furthermore, the possibility of changing mentors allowed for a  smooth  adaptation  of
what was left of the hierarchy to evolving social relationships.
We define this capacity to adapt to internal changes as  fluidity,  as  opposed  to  flexibility,
which is usually defined as the ability to adapt to  changes  in  the  external  environment  (e.g.
Aaker and Mascarenhas, 1982). All organisations are subject to  changes  from  within,  as  the
social dynamics evolve  despite  formal  structures,  and  the  skills,  competencies,  needs  and
goals  of  the  members  develop  and  modify  over  time.  The  very  evolution  of   individual
capabilities and knowledge is in fact an important source of opportunity, if the  organisation  is
able to tap these resources in  an  effective  and  efficient  way.  Formal  structures  and  career
paths, however, tend to constrain and to channel the flow of skills and knowledge.  At  Oticon,
in contrast, the ambiguity of the role system and the negotiated nature of the structure improve
the likelihood that individual skills and  knowledge  will  be  applied  where  most  needed,  as
people  redesign  their  roles  according  to  their  own  evolving  skills  and  the  needs  of   the
organisation, and no departmental barriers constrain the development of  informal  patterns  of
co-operation in the projects. Whereas in  a  traditional  bureaucratic  organisation  the  position
strictly defines the role and the responsibilities of the employee,  employees  at  Oticon  define
and redefine their roles accumulating and changing their portfolio  of  jobs  according  to  their
evolving skills and competencies. The allocation of  personal  time  and  attention  to  different
tasks and projects is not imposed by a central authority, but arises out of a negotiation  process
between different actors, as project leaders negotiate with each other and  with  prospective  or
current project members. As the CEO told us:
Conflicts about resources are usually very clear to the people involved, and if they have all
the information, they are the ones who can best solve them. They may occasionally make a
wrong decision, but I’m sure that a central manager would make more.
Not only did the greater fluidity in the organisation  lead  to  a  more  efficient  use  of  individual  specialised
knowledge, however, but it also helped to overcome the obstacles to a substantial innovation in the design  of  the
product that the formal structure and a strong departmental identification had created.  Retrospective  descriptions
of the company  during  the  seventies  and  the  eighties  actually  indicate  the  existence  of  a  marked  informal
professional  hierarchy,  with  the  technicians  and  the  development  engineers  well  above   the   sales   people.
Engineers, and the advanced BTE technology that they commanded, were regarded as crucial to the  maintenance
of Oticon’s leading market share. As the market changed, however, the BTE  technology  gradually  became  less
and less appropriate to the emerging needs. It was not long before the very same  core  technological  competence
that had  brought  Oticon  to  its  dominant  position  in  the  market,  proved  to  be  a  major  impediment  to  the
development of a new product architecture. Development engineers saw ITE devices as a “flash in the  pan”,  and
the technician-dominated management offered little support to the development  of  the  new  technology.  Oticon
decided instead to reinforce its core technologies, and kept investing its resources in analogue BTE products: as a
consequence, the development of ITEs came to a halt. As the ITE segment grew during the eighties, the company
found itself tied to an old design, while the development of the  technologies  for  fulfilling  market  requirements
was lagging behind. In other words, its core competencies had become “core  rigidities”  (Lonard  Barton,  1992),
impeding the development and establishment of new capabilities  and  a  reconfiguration  of  product  architecture
based on different functional  and  technological  premises.  The  distribution  of  roles  and  the  decision-making
patterns had slowly crystallized around a “dominant design” (Henderson and Clark, 1990), namely BTE analogue
devices and the technical skills on which these were based. The presence of a  rigidly  defined  hierarchy  of  jobs
and positions, based on tradition and professional prestige, ultimately  inhibited  the  development  of  knowledge
outside the established domains.
In the first few years after the change, on the other hand, Oticon  rapidly  introduced  major
changes in the architecture of the product, none of them apparently posing any obstacle  to  the
subsequent reconfiguration  of  existing  knowledge  and  competencies  into  other  innovative
products. The fluid nature of the organisation does seem to have  prevented  dominant  designs
from becoming embedded in a web of institutionalised practices and roles such as often reflect
tasks critical to effective design (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The  indeterminacy  of  the  role
system left the structure more  open  to  periodic  redefinition.  Although  formal  channels  are
designed around component capabilities and related pools  of  professional  knowledge,  much
communication is in fact left to  the  informal  relationships  that  develop  within  and  around
projects,  where  the  integration  among  capabilities  occurs.   Patterns   of   cooperation   and
communication  thus  evolved  over  time,  following  the  continual  reconfigurations   of   the
structure that were produced at the beginning and end of the various projects. As new products
became established, project teams evolved into  product  management  structures  that  did  not
overlap or replace already existing ones, but co-existed with them.
A looser identification of individuals with the  particular  competence  area  and  functional
structure to which they belonged, also helped to reduce the phenomenon described by Leonard-
Barton (1992), whereby entrenched capabilities, legitimated by past success and represented in
the  formal  authority  structure,  pose  a  serious  obstacle  to  the   detection   and   nurture   of
innovative capabilities, either because of perceptual filters or because they threaten  to  subvert
the established “hierarchy of professions”. People in Oticon, on the contrary, are  only  loosely
coupled to any professional group. They are constantly exposed to the application of  different
skills  and  encouraged  to  broaden  their  competence  base.  These  conditions   weaken   any
tendency  to  defensive  behaviour  and  reduce  frictions  in  the  transfer  of  knowledge;  they
improve the assessment of the relative value of one’s own and other  people’s  knowledge  and
increase the probability of detecting opportunities for novel recombinations of knowledge.
Stimulating the encounter of ideas and the integration of perspectives
Most of our respondents  agreed  that  what  had  aggravated  the  problems  and  delays  in
product development that undermined the company’s  competitiveness  in  the  eighties  was  a
lack of communication between the research and marketing  people.  The  prototype  that  later
led to the top-selling Multifocus had been with the research department for a decade, where its
commercial value  was  greatly  misjudged  and  its  development  was  given  low  priority.  It
wasn’t until the new structure was introduced that its potential value  became  apparent,  and  a
project  group  composed  of  people  from  the  former  research,  engineering  and  marketing
groups developed Multifocus, the first fully automated hearing aid.
The abolition of functional membership and the establishment  of  project  teams  spanning
over the former functional boundaries  greatly  improved  communication  between  functional
areas.  This  change  hasn’t  just  improved  the  assessment  of  prototypes  developed  on   the
research side, but has also increased the  efficiency  of  the  development  process  itself.  As  a
member of the development group told us:
Years ago we physically developed the product and then we handed it  over  to  marketing.
Now we encourage people to take responsibility for  the  entire  project  and  to  participate
actively in every phase, regardless of whether  their  skills  are  specifically  involved.  The
task  of  the  project  group  is  not  just  to  develop  a  physical  product:  aspects  such  as
marketing and sales or software design are developed jointly in the project.
Now, at the start of any project, all the people who will be involved throughout the project are already part of
the group. The inclusion in the team of people with different backgrounds and skills right from the  start  helps  to
anticipate the kind of problems that used to arise at later  stages  in  product  development.  In  the  past,  a  lot  of
relevant specialised  knowledge,  such  as  the  marketing  people  possessed,  was  accessed  late  in  the  process,
something that  frequently  called  for  several  iterations  between  researchers,  designers  and  the   market  side.
Instead, the new organisation facilitates  the  emergence  and  integration  of  different  perspectives  in  the  early
stages of product development. The result is  an  enrichment  of  the  product  system,  which  is  no  longer  “just
hardware” but offers a complete package aimed at relieving hearing deficiencies. Product development no  longer
focuses solely on the physical product, as it used  to.  The  contribution  of  market  people  and  audiologists  has
helped, on the one hand, to extend the concerns of a project to include such things  as  packaging,  user  interface,
instructions and design, and on the other to offer service to users and dealers as part of the overall package.
Earlier research on innovation processes had already  identified  extensive  communication
as a  relevant  antecedent  to  continuous  innovation  in  rapidly  changing  environments  (e.g.
Burns and  Stalker,  1961;  Henderson,  1994;  Brown  and  Eisenhardt,  1997).  However,  our
findings suggest that  extensive  communication  is  only  one  aspect  of  a  broader  structural
attribute that we can call interconnectedness, which is  related  to  the  reduction  in  structural,
cultural and social communication  barriers  that  followed  the  elimination  of  the  traditional
departmental and hierarchical coupling mechanisms, and to  the  opening  up  of  the  decision-
making  process  to  contributions  from  individuals  of  different  expertise  and  seniority,  in
different ways and different points in time. We define interconnectedness as  the  richness  and
frequency of  contact  and  information  exchange  among  the  different  parts  of  the  system.
Oticon’s CEO considered interconnection among units  as  a  basic  requirement  for  effective
product development in the mutated technological scenario:
When the product becomes knowledge rather than hardware, the  organisation  must  become  a  brain  rather
than a machine. The brain is flexible, it builds on a number of knowledge centres, and it comprises an almost
chaotic network of relationships between those centres. The last thing the brain looks like is a hierarchy.
A first element in this greater interconnectedness was the elimination  of  departmental  membership  and  the
establishment of the team-based multi-job system, which substantially increased the  number  and  variety  of  the
working relationships that every individual developed, and helped to overcome  inter-departmental  barriers.  The
multi functional projects now allow engineering, audiological and market knowledge  to  be  combined  from  the
early stages of product development. The participation of  all  projects  members  right  from  the  start  helps  the
development of a common knowledge base or  a  common  framework  that  facilitates  the  cooperation  between
audiologists, engineers and marketing people, and stimulates the creative application of specialised knowledge  in
designing, packaging and  servicing,  all  wiht  a  view  to  increasing  benefits  for  the  end  user.  Customer  and
marketing concerns now affect product development and  even  research,  with  significant  improvements  in  the
speed and market success of  new  product  development  as  a  result.  Functions  and  features  that  increase  the
benefits to the consumer may be included already at the prototype stage,  and  the  number  of  iterations  between
designers and marketing people has been virtually reduced to zero.
The increased  interconnectedness  among  people  and  units  was  also  stimulated  by  the
radical  changes  in  the  physical  layout  that   were   considered   a   necessary   support   and
complement to the indeterminacy of the structure. Traditional offices  were  thought  to  create
emotional barriers and to  prevent,  or  at  least  to  impede,  free  movement  and  spontaneous
interaction between people. Offices and corridors  were  thus  replaced  by  open  spaces  filled
with  uniform  workstations,  consisting  of   a   drawerless   desk   complete   with   computer,
telephone, fax, etc. Everyone, including  the  CEO,  was  assigned  a  personal  file  cabinet  on
wheels, and  people  were  encouraged  to  move  freely  to  and  from  common  workstations,
changing their location according to their project work. In view of this, the flexible  interaction
allowed by the new layout is regarded as a critical condition for the periodic reconfiguration of
patterns of interaction and co-operation around the development and management of products.
In the words of one of our  informants:  “The  office  layout  allows  product  groups  and  task
forces to be formed, to act, to work and to dissolve quickly and flexibly.”
A coffee counter has been installed on every floor and employees are encouraged to stop at
the counters and to stay awhile in the cafeteria. These are meeting-points; time spent talking to
one another is not regarded as wasted, but as a potential source of new idea and initiatives.  As
one manager told us: “Ideas  very  often  come  up  at  lunch  time.  Maybe  someone  has  just
returned from a conference or talks about a competitor’s new product and I say ‘Hey, I see  no
reason why we couldn’t do that’.” The absence of  offices  and  the  numerous  meeting-points
thus make it easier for people to make  contact,  to  combine  the  knowledge  and  information
they possess and to give birth to autonomous development  initiatives.  Furthermore,  it’s  easy
for everyone  to  get  to  hear  about  opportunities  for  contributing  their  skills  and  ideas  to
ongoing or upcoming projects, thus improving the general  use  of  individual  knowledge  and
capabilities at all the stages in development projects.
Finally, interconnectedness is also manifest in the decision process that shapes the strategic
direction. Officially, responsibility for setting priorities and establishing the strategic  direction
is vested in the development group, but not many of its members are directly involved in  day-
to-day development. A number of subgroups and committees  aid  the  development  group  by
adding different perspectives to the decision-making process. For instance, a  so-called  review
group, composed of four people from marketing, software, sales, and information  technology,
is  responsible  for  reviewing  short-  and  long-term  plans  twice   a   year.   The   specialised
knowledge possessed by members of the group, both in terms of  professional  knowledge  and
environmental representations, is then integrated in the strategic process that guides  corporate
renewal. Furthermore, employee task  forces  are  specifically  constituted  to  ensure  a  richer
understanding of  competitive  and  technological  development  inside  and  outside  the  firm.
Members of these groups come from  different  functional  areas  to  ensure  a  broad  range  of
views.  They  are  deeply  involved  in  product  development  and  are  thus  able   to   provide
immediate feedback about the implications of strategic decisions for the operations, the people
and the resources engaged in product  development,  and  vice  versa.  Strategic  decisions  can
thus be said to result  from  a  comprehensive  process  in  which  different  interpretations  are
represented and exert an influence on the results. As one  member  of  the  development  group
explained: “We are not just listening  to  them:  they  take  an  active  part  in  the  process  and
ultimately influence the final decision.” 
As a  result  of  greater  interconnectedness,  the  structural  arrangements  that  established
ambiguity and loose coupling in the  system  was  also  able  to  facilitate  the  emergence  and
integration  of  dispersed  knowledge.  On   the   one   hand,   the   reduction   in   departmental
identification  and  the  promotion  of  cross-functional  communication   helped   to   create   a
fracture  between  the  engineers  and  the  marketing  people   and   facilitated   a   sharing   of
knowledge and ideas, all of which  improved  the  efficiency  of  the  integration  process  as  a
whole.  At  the  same  time,  the  increase  in   occasional   encounters   and   the   fostering   of
socialisation  created  a  favourable  context  for  the  casual  exchange  and  transfer  of  ideas.
Finally, setting up a number of committees and task forces and involving them in the  strategic
decision-making broadened the scope of the knowledge integration, because a wider  range  of
perspectives and points of  view  are  now  taken  into  consideration  and  incorporated  in  the
process.
Conclusions
A knowledge-based view of  competition  (e.g.  Kogut  and  Zander,  1992,  Grant,  1996a)
suggests  that  competitive   advantage   rests   on   the   ability   to   combine   and   recombine
organisational and individual knowledge  continuously,  in  a  creative,  valuable  and  flexible
way. In hypercompetitive industries, where products and strategies evolve from the integration
of a broad range of different technological platforms and technical capabilities,  the  efficiency
and   effectiveness   of   this   process   becomes   critical.   Consequently,   research   on    new
organisational forms is exploring the design and the management of  processes  and  structures
that improve the  firm’s  ability  to  develop  and  integrate  specialised  knowledge  (Daft  and
Lewin, 1993; Ilinitch, D’Aveni and Lewin, 1996).
In this article we have presented findings from an in-depth study of Oticon A/S, a producer
of hearing-aid instruments and one of the most highly praised  innovators  of  the  last  decade.
The hearing-aid industry has witnessed at least three major  reconfigurations  of  the  dominant
design of the product in the last twenty years, and the introduction of digital technology during
the nineties has broadened the scope and  speeded  up  the  pace  of  competition  considerably
(Business Week, 1999). Aggressive innovators like Oticon  itself  and,  more  recently,  Widex
and GN Danavox –  who,  incidentally,  have  adopted  an  organisational  structure  similar  to
Oticon’s – are winning market shares from the previous leaders Starkey Inc. and Siemens AG,
thanks  to   their   early   development   and   exploitation   of   new   technologies.   Long-term
competitive advantage rests increasingly on  continuous  innovation  in  the  basic  architecture
and core functions of the product. Evidence from our study suggests that the undisputed ability
for continuous innovation displayed  by  Oticon  in  the  period  studied  builds  on  a  superior
ability for integrating the specialised skills and expertise dispersed throughout the organisation
into successful new products, in an efficient and flexible way. In turn, the effectiveness  of  the
process  seems  to  be  supported  by  structural  attributes  of   the   company’s   organisational
structure.
Effective knowledge integration depends on the extent to which the  organisation  accesses
and exploits individual knowledge, the breadth of specialised knowledge that the  organisation
draws upon, and the extent to which  the  organisation  can  access  additional  knowledge  and
reconfigure existing knowledge (Grant, 1996). Traditional organisational forms based on  rigid
structures and hierarchical control over distributed tasks, on the other hand,  tend  to  constrain
the circulation and use of individual knowledge, to narrow the scope of accessible  knowledge,
to crystallize structures  around  core  capabilities,  and  eventually  to  impede  or  slow  down
innovation at the organisational level. Evidence from our study suggests instead that a  loosely
coupled structure based on structural ambiguity creates a favourable context for the  unfolding
of the three processes described above.
The   effective   management   of   knowledge   integration   –   just   like   strategy-making
(Mintzberg,  1979)  or  corporate  renewal  (Burgelman,  1991)  –  requires  a  careful   balance
between deliberate and emergent processes. On the one hand, the development and integration
of knowledge can and should be actively promoted through research and experimentation  and
the exchange, transfer or diffusion of know-how and information. On the other, the dispersion,
the context specificity and the tacit nature of much valuable knowledge reduce  the  likelihood
of a co-ordinating unit successfully detecting  and  evaluating  all  the  potential  combinations
(Galunic   and   Rodan,   1998).   New   patterns   of   knowledge   integration   often    emerge
spontaneously, as new routines and practices replace old ones (Nelson and Winter, 1982), new
capabilities evolve (Leonard-Barton, 1992), and spontaneous initiatives lead  to  new  products
and internal entrepreneurial ventures (Burgelman, 1991).
Tight-coupling  mechanisms  such  as  hierarchies   and   formal   structures   often   reflect
dominant knowledge about environmental conditions or about the  resources  available  within
the organisation. In this way, they represent an attempt to  organise  knowledge  flows  around
critical patterns of integration, embodied in products and routines, and to reproduce successful
practices  and  behaviours.  However,  as  environmental   conditions   change   and   dominant
knowledge   becomes   obsolete,   formal   structures   of   co-ordination    often    impede    the
development of new and more appropriate or valuable patterns of integration  (Henderson  and
Clark,  1990;  Leonard-Barton,  1992;  Dougherty  and  Heller,   1994).   Valuable   knowledge
possessed  by  separate  individuals  remains  hidden  and  unproductive;  innovative  solutions
remain unexplored, while formal structures channel and constrain attention and the  search  for
alternatives.
Evidence from the case suggests, rather, that the intrinsic ambiguity and  indeterminacy  of
a loosely coupled structural arrangement create  a  favourable  context  for  the  coexistence  of
both  co-ordinated  and  spontaneous  processes  of  combining  and  recombining  knowledge.
Loose coupling implies not the complete absence of  co-ordination,  but  that  co-ordination  in
loosely coupled organisations relies on multiple centres and criteria.  At  Oticon,  for  instance,
decomposing the traditional functional hierarchy allowed for the distribution  of  responsibility
for the development, transfer and use of knowledge  to  a  multiplicity  of  co-ordination  roles.
Professional  managers   and   mentors   now   concentrate   on   developing   and   transferring
knowledge,  project  leaders  are  responsible  for  the   efficiency   and   effectiveness   of   the
integration  of  specialised  knowledge  that  occurs  within  the   projects,   while   central   co-
ordination ensures a balance between initiatives aimed at  exploiting  existing  knowledge  and
capabilities, and initiatives aimed at exploring new patterns of integration. The plurality of co-
ordination centres ensures  that  a  greater  variety  of  perspectives  influences  the  integration
process, while the fluidity of the system reduces  the  likelihood  that  the  new  distribution  of
roles and the new patterns of co-operation between people will re-crystallise around  dominant
cognitive  frameworks.  In  other  words,  the  combined  effect  of  fluidity  and   multipolarity
improves  the  co-ordination  of  knowledge-related  activities,  as  the  dispersal  of  roles  and
responsibilities comes to reflect  more  closely  the  requirements  of  knowledge  management
and, over time, to adapt  smoothly to the development of new capabilities  and  the  emergence
of new patterns of integration.
Fluidity and interconnectedness, on the other hand, stimulate  the  spontaneous  emergence
and  combination  of  individual  specialised  knowledge.  The  efficiency  of   the   integration
process depends to a large  extent  on  the  fact  that  the  knowledge  and  skills  possessed  by
individuals are used to  their  best  advantage  and  where  their  application  is  most  valuable.
Nonetheless,  given  the  dispersion  and  the  tacit  nature   of   much   individual   knowledge,
organisations can’t rely exclusively on purposeful search. It is often more productive to  create
a favourable framework, so that new combinations emerge from the spontaneous initiatives  of
individuals or groups. In most organisations, though, communication constraints and structural
rigidities impede an effective exploitation of existing knowledge. At  Oticon,  in  contrast,  the
fluid nature of the organisation  got  rid  of  most  of  the  structural,  social  and  psychological
barriers to the free movement of people, knowledge and ideas across units. Meanwhile, greater
interconnectedness has intensified the number of encounters, thus increasing the likelihood  of
cross-fertilisation and the spontaneous start of new explorative ventures. Both properties  have
contributed  to  changing  an  established  culture  based  on  departmental   identification   and
opposition,  and  to  developing  a  common   framework   that   facilitates   dialogue   between
specialists of different kinds.
Up to now the concept of loose coupling  has  been  used  as  a  conceptual  framework  for
understanding organisational functioning rather than for designing  structures.  Evidence  from
the case suggests instead that loose coupling can be the consequence of a deliberate  structural
choice  about  the  distribution  of  authority,  roles  and  responsibilities,  and   about   the   co-
ordination and control of activities. However, by no means do we claim that  our  findings  are
conclusive. We agree with Robert Grant that, given the “uniqueness of  knowledge  bases  and
institutional  conditions,  firms   can   achieve   equally   effective,   yet   highly   differentiated
approaches to knowledge integration” (1996b, p. 380), and it is therefore impossible to specify
an optimal organisational arrangement that would lead to  a  superior  capacity  for  knowledge
integration. In the past, concepts such as “modularity” (i.e.  Sanchez  and  Mahoney,  1996)  or
“virtuality”  (i.e.  Davidow  and  Malone,  1992)  have  been  introduced  to  describe   specific
structural  arrangements   that   lead   to   a   comparative   ability   to   change   and   adapt   to
environmental dynamics. Here, we have not described any “best way” to  organise  knowledge
integration. We believe, however, that by investigating  the  causal  links  between  managerial
action and organisational outcome, our article can  help  to  extend  our  knowledge  about  the
characteristics of new organisational forms.  Further,  by  describing  in  detail  how  structural
ambiguity was introduced and managed in the  organisation,  we  offer  a  connection  between
theory  and  practice  and,  provide  some  practical  indications  about  how  to   facilitate   the
combination and recombination of knowledge by a redesigning of the organisation.
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Figure 1          Introducing structural ambiguity in the organisation
|                   |   |Bottom-up initiation|   |                    |     |Individual roles and tasks       |
|                   |   |of projects         |   |                    |     |distribution are continually     |
|                   |   |                    |   |                    |     |redefined by the riconfiguration |
|                   |   |                    |   |                    |     |of the structure brought about by|
|                   |   |                    |   |                    |     |individual action                |
|All activities run |   |                    |   |Task distribution   |     |                                 |
|by projects        |   |                    |   |determined by number|     |                                 |
|                   |   |                    |   |and structure of    |     |                                 |
|                   |   |                    |   |projects            |     |                                 |
|                   |   |Open participation  |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |in projects (subject|   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |to negotiation)     |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |                    |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|Abolition of       |   |Individual          |   |Personal portfolio  |     |Loose role       |   |           |
|departments and    |   |responsibilities for|   |of job defined by   |     |structure        |   |           |
|departmental       |   |allocation of time  |   |individual choices  |     |                 |   |           |
|positions          |   |and attention       |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |                    |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|Abolition of formal|   |Multi-job system    |   |Flexible attribution|     |                 |   |           |
|positions          |   |                    |   |of individuals to   |     |                 |   |STRUCTURAL |
|                   |   |                    |   |professional areas  |     |                 |   |AMBIGUITY  |
|                   |   |                    |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |Appointment of      |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |project leaders     |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |(co-ordination along|   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |projects) on an ad  |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |hoc basis           |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|Distributed        |   |                    |   |Undetermined        |     |                 |   |           |
|co-ordination      |   |                    |   |relative positions  |     |                 |   |           |
|responsibility     |   |                    |   |of individuals      |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |Establishment of    |   |                    |     |Loose authority  |   |           |
|                   |   |professional        |   |                    |     |relationships    |   |           |
|                   |   |co-ordinators       |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |(functional         |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |co-ordination across|   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |projects)           |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|Abolition of       |   |                    |   |Bottom-up choice of |     |                 |   |           |
|functional         |   |                    |   |mentors             |     |                 |   |           |
|authority          |   |                    |   |                    |     |                 |   |           |
|                   |   |Establishment of    |   |                    |     |Co-ordination responsibilities of|
|                   |   |mentors (control    |   |                    |     |different nature and control over|
|                   |   |over rewards)       |   |                    |     |rewards are de-coupled           |
Table 1             Product innovation at Oticon, 1991-1997.
| NAME         |YEAR   |TYPE OF       |MAJOR BENEFITS                          |
|              |       |INNOVATION    |                                        |
|MultiFocus    |1991   |Radical       |First fully automatic non-linear        |
|              |       |              |amplifier                               |
| Personic     |1992   |Incremental   |Pleasant design and surface texture, and|
|              |       |              |wide colour range to harmonise with     |
|              |       |              |facial features                         |
|Oticon 4 kids |1993   |Incremental   |Colours and design more appealing to and|
|              |       |              |easy-to-wear for kids                   |
|MultiFocus    |1994   |Incremental   |Same quality of sound processing,       |
|Mild          |       |              |smaller size; designed for young users  |
|MicroFocus    |1995   |Incremental   |First programmable instrument, based on |
|              |       |              |analogue amplification process          |
|DigiFocus     |1996   |Radical       |First 100% digital hearing aid          |
|DigiLife      |1997   |Incremental   |Simpler and faster fitting principle    |
|              |       |              |programmable via a portable unit        |
Table 2            Benefits of structural ambiguity to the integration of knowledge
|NEW STRUCTURAL FEATURES          |RELATED        |POSITIVE EFFECTS ON KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION                     |
|                                 |STRUCTURAL     |                                                              |
|                                 |PROPERTIES     |                                                              |
|                                                 |Efficiency of       |Scope of         |Flexibility of         |
|                                                 |integration         |integration      |integration            |
|Abolition of departments         |Multipolarity |Distributed and     |-                |-                      |
|Separation of hierarchical       |              |focused             |                 |                       |
|authority and co-ordination role |              |responsibility for  |                 |                       |
|Individual responsibility for    |              |the development,    |                 |                       |
|allocation of time and attention |              |transfer and use of |                 |                       |
|Central co-ordination of renewal |              |knowledge           |                 |                       |
|process (development group)      |              |Distributed         |                 |                       |
|                                 |              |responsibility for  |                 |                       |
|                                 |              |the integration of  |                 |                       |
|                                 |              |capabilities of     |                 |                       |
|                                 |              |different levels    |                 |                       |
|Abolition of strict functional   |Fluidity      |Informal patterns of|Flexible         |Structures and patterns|
|membership                       |              |co-operation are not|redefinition of  |of communication evolve|
|Abolition of jobs and positions  |              |constrained by      |jobs, reflecting |with, rather than      |
|Multi-job system                 |              |formal structure    |the range of     |constrain, the         |
|Bottom-up choice of mentors      |              |Optimal allocation  |individual skills|redefinition of        |
|                                 |              |of individual skills|and knowledge    |activities             |
|                                 |              |and knowledge to the|                 |Loose connection with  |
|                                 |              |various development |                 |competence groups      |
|                                 |              |activities          |                 |                       |
|Abolition of strict functional   |Interconnected|Development of      |Broader range of |More occasions for the |
|membership                       |ness          |common knowledge    |specialist       |exchange of ideas and  |
|Project-based organisation       |              |Institutionalisation|knowledge        |the creative           |
|combined with multi-job system   |              |of spontaneous      |integrated in the|recombination of       |
|Open and flexible working lay-out|              |contribution to the |strategic        |knowledge              |
|(‘mobile offices’)               |              |renewal process     |decision making  |                       |
|Broad participation in strategic |              |Emergence of        |                 |                       |
|decisions                        |              |dispersed knowledge |                 |                       |
